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ABSTRACT
Despite the expansion of trade and investment achieved by the North
American Free Trade Agreement, challenges remain. The most serious is
the persistence of an “income gap” between Mexico and its northern
neighbors. Unless this gap is narrowed, other challenges, including immi-
gration, trade, and security, will persist. The solution is the creation of a
viable North American Investment Fund, which will be possible only if
the three governments articulate a North American Community and
pledge to contribute, each in its own way, to a strategy that will close the
income gap and build institutions to resolve old problems and address
new opportunities.
Key words: NAFTA, investment, North American Community, free trade, immigra-
tion, income gap, debt, monetary policy, regulation
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY, 
IMMIGRATION, AND TRADE
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect on January 1,
1994 and, in 13 years, trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United States tripled
and foreign direct investment quintupled, making North America the largest free
trade area in the world. Despite this success, relations among all three countries de-
teriorated, and a swirl of problems led many to view NAFTA as a failure. 
A major cause of the deterioration of relations is the failure of the three govern-
ments to find agreement on immigration, trade, and security. None of these pro-
blems can be solved easily or soon, but serious progress is not possible until the
three governments begin to construct a “community of interests” in which each of
them commits significant resources and undertakes reforms to close the income gap
between Mexico and its two neighbors and forge institutions and procedures to
sustain trust. 
Why is the income gap so important to each of the three issues? Contrary to
conventional wisdom, more than 90 percent of the undocumented workers from Mex-
ico do not come to the United States seeking jobs. They leave jobs in Mexico for much
better wages in the United States. Unless the income gap is significantly narrowed,
migration from Mexico will continue to expand. Securing the United States after
9/11 depends on a secure continent and that is difficult when one of the weakest links
is Mexico’s poverty. Finally, free trade policies have become unpopular because of
chronic disputes, the view by some in the United States that jobs are lost because
of free trade, the failure of the United States to comply with NAFTA courts, and the
view that Mexico would be more developed if free trade worked. 
All three problems point to the same solution: a North American Investment
Fund which invests US$20 billion per year for a decade to close the income gap by
grants to build infrastructure –roads, communications, railroads, ports– to connect
the poor center and south of Mexico to its northern neighbors. Ten billion dollars
would come from additional taxes by Mexicans, US$9 billion would come from the
United States, and US$1 billion from Canada. But these would only be part of an
arrangement whereby Mexico undertakes the kinds of reforms that would allow it
to make effective use of these resources.
Such a fund is only possible if the three governments articulate a North Amer-
ican Community and pledge to contribute, each in its own way, to a strategy that will
close the income gap and build institutions to resolve old problems and address new
opportunities. That is the solution. Now, what exactly is the problem? If immigrants
contribute to the U.S. economy so much, why is immigration a problem?
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During a state visit by Mexican President Vicente Fox in September 2001, just
days before the September 11 tragedy, President George W. Bush agreed to re-
form U.S. immigration laws as they affected Mexico. There are about 11 million “un-
documented workers” in the United States, of whom about 6.3 million are Mexicans.
Fox wanted to regularize the status of the Mexicans and ensure a large and steady
flow of temporary workers. Despite Bush’s pledge to address the issue, four years
passed before he sent his cabinet to Congress to outline his administration’s approach.
On October 18, 2005, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff testified,
“The president believes —and I agree— that illegal immigration threatens our com-
munities and our national security.” He proposed more funding for the border patrol,
even though the number of officers tripled and the budget increased 10-fold during
the previous two decades (Massey, 2005).
While the U.S. was concerned with security, the immigration issue is primarily
an economic and social issue. The U.S. wants cheap labor and Mexicans want better
wages in the United States. There is nothing wrong with that, except that Mex-
icans who are in the United States illegally are easily exploited and, thus, are com-
pelled to work harder at wages too low for most Americans. Even during the boom
years of the 1990s, when the income of most Americans improved, the wages of na-
tive-born unskilled workers declined by about 10 percent, due, in part, to more com-
petition by illegal workers. There is also a humanitarian issue of dealing with 11
million illegal migrants in the country.
The United States has embarked on a long journey to cope with these problems,
and while there are many proposals to “regularize” the 11 million undocumented
workers in the country, none can do so without provoking a new wave of illegal mi-
gration. None of these proposals will solve or even reduce the flow of undocu-
mented migration to the United States. Indeed, regularizing the status of those who
are here illegally may well encourage greater flows in the future. This is what occurred
after passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which combined
legalization, which was implemented, and employer sanctions, which were largely
ignored. This was one of the reasons why immigration reform failed to pass the
Senate in June 2007.
The American people are increasingly frustrated and worried about the inabil-
ity of the U.S. government to control the borders. A New York Times/CBS poll in October
2005 found that 75 percent of Americans think that the government should do much
more to keep out illegal aliens, and by May 2007, 82 percent of Americans felt that
way (New York Times, 2007). However, no one has proposed an effective strategy to
address the challenge. The reason is that it would be very expensive to solve this
problem, and there is only one way to dramatically affect the flow. The development
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gap between the United States and Mexico must be narrowed. A strategy aimed to
accomplish that goal would not only reduce illegal migration; it would solve sev-
eral other chronic problems in North America and beyond.
Many in Mexico viewed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as
a vehicle to achieve a first-world economy and close the development gap that sep-
arated it from its northern neighbors. Many in the United States supported NAFTA
in the hope that it would reduce undocumented migration from Mexico. Many in
Latin America and the Caribbean looked at NAFTA as a model for a Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), which would allow them to board a train to the first world.
Although NAFTA expanded trade within North America, neither the development
gap nor undocumented migration diminished, and, as it became clear that free-trade
did not achieve the promise of development, many in Latin America and beyond ques-
tioned the utility of free trade. Until free trade can be viewed as beneficial to its poor-
er members, the prospect of expanding its boundaries will remain small.
Unless and until the development gap between Mexico and the U.S. can begin
to close, the prospect of having a genuine partnership among the three countries of
North America will remain distant. There are other compelling reasons for the three
governments to consider the development gap as the paramount challenge facing
North America. NAFTA, at best, has run out of steam; the continental relationships
are in danger of going into reverse. The policy responses to 9/11 and the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security have constructed a formidable speed bump
on the two borders that impedes trade. 
NAFTA may be viewed as a problem but “North America” is actually a magnif-
icent opportunity. Stimulating Mexico’s economy might be one of the best ways to
promote competitiveness for the entire continent. The most effective response to com-
petition from China, for example, is one that merges the comparative advantages of
each unit of North America. Developing a community of interests in which the
three governments take steps to make the continent more secure and their relation-
ships fair would establish the region as the model. 
DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF NAFTA
The disparity in income between Mexico and its northern neighbors is the most sa-
lient feature of North America. John Audley and Sandra Polaski note that for most
Mexicans, real wages have fallen since NAFTA, though they recognize that the peso
crisis might be a more important factor than NAFTA. While acknowledging that for-
eign direct investment added 400 000 jobs in manufacturing, they also point out that
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this did not keep pace with the growing supply of labor (Audley et al., 2003: 5-6). There
is no disputing the income gap, though there is no agreement as to how to measure
it. Below are four ways to measure it. Table 1 uses GDP per capita in current dollars.
The ratio of U.S. to Mexico begins at 4.03 in 1980 then rises to 5.6 in the year before
NAFTA and to 6.27, a decade later. It declined to 5.5 in 2006 but that still is about 36
percent worse than in 1980. Table 2 measures GDP per capita with constant 2000 dol-
lars and shows more consistency, though the gap is still about 10 percent wider in
2005 than in 1960. Table 3 looks at GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity
(PPP) in current dollars. The PPP measure shows that the gap is about 36 percent
worse in 2005 than in 1980.1
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1 The source for these tables is the U.S. Department of Labor, International Comparisons of Hourly Com-
pensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing–Table 2, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/
ForeignLabor/ichccsuppt02.txt.
Table 1
RATIO OF GDP PER CAPITA (CURRENT PRICES, US$)
BETWEEN THE RICHEST AND THE POOREST NAFTA COUNTRY, 1980-2004
Group* 1980 1990 1993 2000 2002 2004
NAFTA 
(1994) 4.03 7.35 5.58 5.84 5.66 6.27
(U.S./Mexico) (U.S./Mexico) (U.S./Mexico) (U.S./Mexico) (U.S./Mexico) (U.S./Mexico)
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2004.
Table 2
U.S. AND MEXICO: GDP PER CAPITA (CONSTANT 2000 US$), 1960-2005
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 1993 2000 2002 2004 2005
Mexico 2,554 3,576 5,114 4,966 5,174 5,935 5,853 6,056 6,172
United States 14,134 18,150 22,568 28,263 28,747 34,599 34,669 36,451 37,267
Dev. gap ratio 5.53 5.08 4.41 5.69 5.56 5.83 5.92 6.02 6.04
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, http:devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/
Emigrants do not bother to examine the aggregate data. Their motives for mov-
ing probably are diverse. The conventional view is that they come to the United States
in search of jobs. But several surveys of Mexican immigrants in the United States dur-
ing the past 20 years found that the overwhelming majority had jobs before leaving
Mexico. According to the Mexican Migration Project (a 15-year bi-national project
directed by Jorge Durand at the University of Guadalajara and Douglas Massey at
the University of Pennsylvania), the percentage of immigrants who were unem-
ployed before leaving Mexico for the United States declined steadily from 13 percent
in 1970 to 6.4 percent in the 1990s. Another survey found that since the 1990s, more
than 93 percent of Mexican immigrants to the United States –legal and illegal– left
jobs in Mexico (Durand et al., 2001: table 4, 121). This data is consistent with several
other large data sets from both the Mexican statistical agenda and the U.S. Census
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Table 3
U.S. AND MEXICO: GDP PER CAPITA - PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
(CURRENT INTERNATIONAL US$), 1980-2005
Country 1980 1990 1993 2000 2002 2004
Mexico 4,279 6,280 7,087 9,197 9,451 10,240
United States 12,186 23,064 25,409 34,599 36,126 39,772
Dev. gap ratio 2.85 3.67 3.59 3.76 3.82 3.88
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database, http:devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/
Table 4
HOURLY WAGES (US$) FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS 
IN MANUFACTURING, 1980-2005
COUNTRY 1980 1990 1993 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005
Canada 8.87 16.33 16.97 16.48 16.72 19.53 21.77 23.82
US 9.63 14.81 16.37 19.65 21.33 2.22 22.82 23.65
Mexico 2.2 1.57 2.36 2.07 2.49 2.44 2.44 2.63
Ratio of highest US/Mex. Can./Mex. Can./Mex. US/Mex. US/Mex. US/Mex. US/Mex. Can./Mex.
to lowest 4.4 10.4 7.2 9.5 8.6 9.1 9.4 9.1
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers
in Manufacturing-Table 2, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ForeignLabor/ichccsuppt02.txt
Bureau. Research on the causes of migration from the Caribbean in the early 1980s
also found that the emigrants left jobs (Pastor, 1985: 14).
They are coming in search of higher wages, and in Table 4, the gap in hourly
wages for production workers in manufacturing between 1980 and 2005 more than
doubled, rising from 4.4 to 9.1. Still, another study suggests that current wage dif-
ferentials are 10 to 1 and are expected to grow to 13 to 1 (Ibarra and Soloaga, 2005:
11). What this means is that the average Mexican worker in a manufacturing plant
can earn perhaps 10 times or more working in the United States than he or she could
in Mexico. Although family networks play an important role in determining where
immigrants locate, the most powerful magnet is the economy. 
Other studies have shown that the higher U.S. wages are relative to Mexican
wages, the higher the probability of migration (Jewell and Molina, 2004). Using re-
gression analyses based on data collected by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP),
Jewell and Molina estimate that a 10-percent increase in the Mexican wage leads to
a 6.9 percent reduction in migration, while a 10-percent decrease in the Mexican wage
leads to a 4.6-percent increase in migration. However, a 10-percent rise in the U.S.
wage increases migration by 8.8 percent. If the wage gap narrowed as a result of a
10-percent reduction in U.S. wages, migration would be reduced by 13.1 percent. If
the wage gap were closed, the probability of migration sinks to practically zero
(Jewell and Molina, 2004). As long as Mexicans can earn much more in the United
States for the same work, the lure of migration will remain compelling. In a poll on
migration, Alducín y Asociados (2003: 17) found that 81.4 percent of Mexicans would
emigrate to the United States if they could. A Pew Hispanic Center study found
fewer –46 percent– ready to move if given the chance.
While the numbers differ in the four tables and the estimates of the impact of
the wage differential on the magnitude of migration differ on the margin, the pat-
tern is similar and persuasive. With every measure and table, the gap has worsened
since 1980. Mexico’s goal of convergence has slipped further away since NAFTA
began and the impact on migration to the United States is indisputable. The larger
the gap in income, the more immigrants will come.
TWO OTHER GAPS
It is true that average wages for all Mexicans have not improved since NAFTA came
into force. But a more instructive conclusion emerges when one looks below that
fact to sector and geographical gaps, both of which opened wider because of the
trade agreement and its first (peso) crisis. The first gap was between the country’s
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growing export sector and its domestic market and the second gap was geographi-
cal, between the northern and the center-south of the country. 
The reduction in barriers to the flow of capital induced a surge of short-term
loans to Mexico in 1993. When two political assassinations, including of the leading
presidential candidate, unsettled the market and lenders began to withdraw their
money, the Mexican government took dramatic steps to keep the funds. It sharply
raised interest rates and promised to pay the loans in dollars, but this only made a dif-
ficult debt problem worse. When the government finally devalued, during Christmas
1994, the bottom fell out of the market and the country tipped on the edge of bank-
ruptcy. The failure of either the United States or Mexico to anticipate such a crisis
and create a substantial swap arrangement further exacerbated the problem and the
Mexican economy sank 6.2 percent, its sharpest and worse decline since the Great
Depression. Because of NAFTA and the expansion of an export-oriented manufac-
turing sector, the impact on the economy was uneven. The domestic side of the
economy declined by 14 percent, while the export sector grew.2
NAFTA also contributed to Mexico’s geographical disparities, which were already
serious. About half of all domestic production is concentrated in Mexico City and the
states of Mexico, Jalisco (Guadalajara), and Nuevo León (Monterrey). After the 1994
crisis, the disparities between regions became even more pronounced. The south-
ern states of Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca have the weakest infrastructure: a quar-
ter of the households there are without water or electricity; roads are unpaved; the
telecommunications infrastructure is less than half of the national average (Fay, 2003).
An analysis of the eight regions of Mexico by the Confederation of Industrial Chambers
of Commerce (Concamin), using data from Mexico’s statistical agency (INEGI), con-
cluded that the social and economic gap between the regions widened since NAFTA.
Another analysis found that the gap widened because the northern states, connect-
ed to the U.S. market and with more foreign investment, grew 10 times faster than
the southern ones, which do not have the infrastructure to bring goods to market.3
The two gaps that opened wider since NAFTA suggest that Mexico’s economic
problem was not due to the treaty, but rather to its absence. In other words, the Za-
patistas got it backwards when they launched their uprising in Chiapas to protest
NAFTA. They were right that NAFTA would not help Chiapas but this was not due to free
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2 For an excellent analysis of the impact of the 1994 crisis, see González Gómez, 1998: 37-66.
3 Tamayo-Flores, 2000: 21. The estimates on the gap between regions vary. Luis Ernesto Derbez, a World
Bank economist, estimated that during the 1990s, the export-oriented North grew at annual rates of 5.9
percent, while the South barely grew at .4 percent, more than 10 times faster, as cited in Tricks, 2001: 6.
Based on data from INEGI and Conapo, the North American Development Bank estimated that the northern
part of Mexico was growing more than twice as fast as the south or center. 
trade; it was because of the lack of it. The south and center of Mexico were not con-
nected to the markets of the north. The success of the export sector and the northern
part of the country are proof that NAFTA succeeded where it connected. For the rest
of Mexico to develop, a new strategy is needed. 
NAFTA’s flaw is that it had no explicit development strategy. Its implicit strategy
is to encourage foreign direct investment in the already congested border areas. Not
surprisingly, the states closest to the United States attracted workers from the heart
of Mexico. Most businesses on the border report a turnover each year of nearly 100
percent, meaning that workers from the south stay in the northern part of Mexico
only long enough to learn how to get across and earn more money. Notwithstanding
the arguments of NAFTA’s proponents, NAFTA encouraged –however unintentionally–
illegal migration to the United States. Foreign firms would prefer to invest in the inte-
rior where the workforce is more stable and there is less congestion, pollution, and
turnover. But they do not because roads and infrastructure are inadequate. 
HOW TO NARROW THE INCOME GAP? 
LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE AND EUROPE
Theories of economic convergence predict that the gap in incomes between richer
and poorer states or sub-regions in a free trade area will narrow because capital will
invest and deploy technology where it can gain greater returns. The United States
offers proof of the theory. After the Civil War, the difference in income between the
northern and southern states was very large. With the benefit of a single currency and
free movement of labor, capital, and goods, that gap narrowed significantly, though
it took a century and involved a massive migration of six million African-Americans
northward between 1916 and 1970 (Kim, 1997; Postrel, 2004; Foner, 1991). In other
words, under the most optimal conditions of free movement of factors of produc-
tion within a single nation-state, more than 100 years were needed to achieve real
convergence in income between rich and poor regions.
In contrast, the European Union significantly closed its income gap between
the richer and the four poorest countries in just 15 years. North America represents a
very different model from Europe’s, and few in the United States would consider repli-
cating the model, but failing to learn from 50 years of experience with regional econo-
mic integration would be a serious mistake.4 The issue for North America is not
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4 For a detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between the European Union and North America
and an evaluation of the EU’s regional and cohesion policies, see Pastor, 2001: Chapters 2-3.
whether to adopt the European model; the two cases are too different. The question
is: What can be learned and adapted from Europe’s experience?
Europe defined one of its principal goals as reducing disparities among mem-
bers, but it did not allocate serious resources to achieving it for nearly 30 years. The
rationale for closing the gap was that “wide disparities are intolerable in a commu-
nity, if the term has any meaning at all.” The EU narrowed the gap between its four
poorer “cohesion” members (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland) in a remarkably
short time. From 1986 to 2003, the per capita GDP in the four cohesion countries rose
from 65 percent of the EU average to 82 percent by 2003 (European Commission,
1996: 13; European Commission, 2003).
While all four cohesion countries have made substantial progress since entering
the EU, an analysis of the differences in their rates of growth is useful for assess-
ing the relative effectiveness of the EU’s regional policies. Ireland has been the most
successful with its per capita income turning it from the poorest country in the
European Union in 1980 into one of its richest today. Although some believe Ireland
succeeded because it reduced taxes and did not receive aid, for the decade begin-
ning in 1989, Ireland received €10.2 billion –equal to 2.8 percent of its GDP– from EU
Structural and Cohesion Funds and the government matched that amount with
counterpart investments, which raised the total investment to 5 percent of GDP
(European Commission, 1997: 73-75). The EU funds began to arrive in 1989, just when
there was a substantial backlog of projects and urgent infrastructural needs. “Without
the support of the structural funds,” a report by the Economic and Social Research
Institute in Dublin concludes, “congestion in public infrastructure and constraints
in third level education would have limited the recovery.” Using several models, the
institute concluded that the combined effect in the period 1995-1999 raised GNP by
3 to 4 percent above the level it would have been without the EU funding (Honohan,
1997: xv-xxi, especially at xviii). Ireland’s trajectory was astonishing but the other
three poor countries (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) also made substantial progress
for much the same reasons. The European Union transferred more than €450 billion
during the past 20 years to them (European Commission, 1996; European Com-
mission, 1997: 45). 
To what extent did these funds contribute to growth in the four cohesion coun-
tries and to the reduction of income disparities? Using regression analyses, Robert
Leonardi of the London School of Economics tested various explanatory variables
and concluded that structural and cohesion aid “made a substantial contribution to
economic investment and overall GDP in the three nations. [It] acted as a significant
stimulus to the national economies, explaining in part the surge of these countries
toward convergence” (Leonardi, 1995: 133, 170-176).
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In its “Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion,” The European Com-
mission found that the structural funds boosted the gross domestic product in
Spain by 1.5 percent more than would have occurred without such funds. The
funds increased growth in Greece by 2 percent, in Ireland by almost 3 percent, and
in Portugal by 4.5 percent more than would have occurred in the absence of such
support (European Commission, 2004: xviii).
What specific lessons should be drawn from the EU experience for North
America?
a) Goals and Institutions. Europe’s leaders defined a goal of solidarity and com-
munity for security and economic reasons. These goals inspired member states and
provided a benchmark from which they could measure progress. The EU established
too many supra-national institutions that continue because it is too hard to elimi-
nate them. The lesson is that some institutions are necessary to promote development,
but policy-makers should incorporate a “sunset” provision into every new institu-
tion and, in the case of North America, it might be better to use an existing institution,
such as the World Bank, rather than create new ones.
b) Convergence and Conditionality. Among the many factors responsible for nar-
rowing the gap were a single market, foreign investment, and massive aid pro-
grams from the EU. An analysis of the difference in growth rates among the four
“cohesion” countries –between Ireland and Greece, for example– leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that national policy is a fourth, critical determinant. The most
effective “national policies” were those that utilized the incentive of conditionality
to maintain stable macro-economic policies and transparency. The lesson is to use the
first three factors as an incentive for the recipient government to adopt the appro-
priate economic policies that would make best use of the resources. 
c) Projects and Personnel. The EU has funded almost every imaginable kind of
project through many structures, but most analysts agree with Rainer Martin that
investments in two areas were most effective: infrastructure and human capital
(Martin, 1998: 66-72).
d) The Magnitude and the Focus of the Commitment. The task of closing the gap
between richer and poorer countries in a free trade area is a formidable one, but the
EU has demonstrated that it can be done, provided that its members make a seri-
ous commitment and appropriate significant funds for that purpose. Europe has
transferred €30 billion per year (US$40 billion). About half –the investments
in infrastructure and human capital– had a multiplier effect on development.
Much of the other half went to the poorer provinces in the richer countries as “side
payments.” 
195
THE SOLUTION TO NORTH AMERICA’S TRIPLE PROBLEM
ESSAYS
A PROPOSAL TO NARROW THE GAP
In contemplating an approach for reducing the gap in North America, let us recall
the development trajectory of two countries on two continents: Mexico and Spain.
The per capita income of Mexico was higher than that of Spain in 1950. By the year
2000, Mexico’s was roughly half that of Spain (Rodríguez Barocio, 2005: 4). There are,
of course, many reasons for this turnabout but, during the last 20 years, two factors
stand out: the magnitude of the EU’s aid to Spain and the reforms Spain undertook
to be an EU member. The aid was essential but the donors would not have con-
tributed without a vision of community, and the recipient would not have under-
taken the reforms without understanding their necessity and without a framework
of external support.
A proposal to reduce the income gap in North America, therefore, requires sever-
al fundamental elements that need to be woven together: 1) a vision and a goal; 2) a
new development strategy; 3) an institution or mechanism to transfer funds; 4) a com-
mitment by all three countries to deliver substantial aid and reforms; 5) a strategy
for negotiating and implementing the package. 
1) Vision and Goal. While the development of Mexico and its integration with
its neighbors is the focus of the proposal, a new cooperative relationship among the
three governments is a prerequisite to achieving that goal. The vision needed to begin
moving in this direction is not one of a union or even a common market. A common
market requires the free movement of labor but that is not possible, given the
income gap, and a union suggests a merging of sovereignties and all three govern-
ments oppose that. 
A “North American Community” may be the best option. It evinces an idea that
is more than three separate nations but it allows its members to define what “more”
they want. The premise of such a community is that each of the three countries ben-
efits from its neighbors’ success and pays a price for its neighbors’ failure, crisis, or set-
back. At some level, this is widely understood and explains why the U.S. helped
Mexico deal with its debt crisis in 1982 and peso crisis in 1994-1995. Of course, Canada
and Mexico are directly affected by events in the United States, whether a counter-
vailing duty or 9/11. In the post- NAFTA world, the economies of the three coun-
tries are so inter-connected that a recession in one country will harm the others and a
boom in one will lift the others. 
When the value of a neighbor’s house rises, that has a positive effect on one’s own
house. When a neighbor’s house burns or is vandalized, then all the houses in the
community are in danger. Those are the two sides of a vision of a North American Com-
munity. Increasing interdependence requires more active involvement by all three
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governments to ensure that the public is protected from a more integrated but less
regulated market.
A community means that the two bilateral relationships should be transformed
into a continental one. Any negotiation in North America reflects the weight of
asymmetry. By the sheer size of its economy, the United States could –and does–
ignore the complaints of each neighbor. This allows problems –like softwood lumber
or sugar– to fester and trust to be eroded. The argument for a continental approach
is that it could help correct some of the imbalance inherent in the two bilateral rela-
tionships. It could do so by focusing on rules rather than raw power.
If this is true, then why do Mexico and Canada not pursue such a community, and
why would the United States accept it? Canada feels that it could do better in a bilat-
eral relationship, though there is scant evidence to prove that, and Mexico has tried
a continental approach but has been rebuffed by Canada and the United States. The
United States faces a classic trade-off on the issue: should it negotiate bilaterally where
it can dominate, or would it be wiser to sacrifice short-term interests in order to cre-
ate a community respected by its neighbors? After World War II, the United States
faced the same choice in Europe: it could have negotiated separately with each coun-
try and assured its dominance, or it could take a long-term approach and provide
aid to Europe on the single condition that Europe would unite. The U.S. chose the more
enlightened approach with the Marshall Plan. The time has come for the United States
to follow a similar path in North America. 
A second question is: why should Canada contribute to a fund for the devel-
opment of Mexico? Canada, of course, had difficulty seeing Mexico over the United
States but, with the approval of NAFTA, it began to develop its relationship with Mex-
ico. As its trade and investment increased, Canada recognized that Mexico’s devel-
opment will yield economic benefits. Canada has an increasing number of emigrants
from Mexico, particularly in the west. Canada does not have a stake in Mexico’s devel-
opment comparable to that of the United States but it does have a sizeable foreign
aid program. The question is whether that aid should continue to be aimed at the
poorest countries or whether it should be part of a new North American strategy.
In addition to economic interests, there are three reasons why Canada should
want to build a North American Community and contribute to a fund to narrow the
development gap. First, Canada is a multilateral institution builder, and there is no
relationship more important to Canada than the one with the United States (James
et al., 2007: ch. 1). It follows that a tri-national institution could be constructed in a
manner that would serve Canada’s long-term interests in assuring that the U.S.
negotiates fairly and complies with the rules of an agreement. Secondly, Canada
wants the U.S. to pay attention to its concerns and is frustrated that it does not. A
joint approach with Mexico, which can gain U.S. attention because of the large Mex-
ican-American population, would certainly assist Canada. But Mexico and Canada
are likely to be more effective if they pursue fair rules rather than appear as if they are
conspiring against the U.S. 
The three governments should set the goal of helping Mexico achieve a sus-
tained rate of growth for at least one decade of at least 6 percent per year. If one
assumes that the U.S. and Canada maintain a growth rate of 3 percent, the income
gap would be reduced by 20 percent in the first decade and, hopefully, provide the
momentum to close the gap within 40 to 50 years. While it would be desirable for
the gap to be closed, the trajectory may be as important. If Mexicans see the gap
closing in a consistent way, self-perceptions could change, and that could mean that
fewer Mexicans would emigrate. 
2) A New Development Strategy. How can Mexico grow at twice the rate of the
United States and Canada? Using a computable general equilibrium model of Mex-
ico, Robinson, Morley, and Diaz-Bonilla conclude that the current export model is
unlikely to generate sufficient growth to begin to close the income gap. Instead,
Mexico needs a fundamental change in development strategy, and they propose two
options. Capital formation would need to be raised to the level of 30 percent or more
of GDP. Without a significant increase in domestic savings, Mexico would need US$30
billion more per year of foreign capital, net of interest payments. An alternative would
be to channel US$17-20 billion in new capital, net of interest payments, each year into
infrastructure and human capital. As Mexico cannot sustain more debt, grants are
needed from abroad. With these investments, they estimate that Mexico could grow
at an annual rate of about 6 percent (Robinson et al., 2005).
Others have pointed to Mexico’s declining competitiveness and attribute it to
Mexico’s inability or unwillingness to undertake essential tax and fiscal, labor, ener-
gy, and electricity reforms. An IMD World Competitiveness Survey attributed declin-
ing competitiveness to poor infrastructure. Of the 30 largest economies in terms of
their infrastructure, the IMD survey found that in just three years –2000-2003– Mex-
ico had slipped from eighteenth to twenty-ninth place, while U.S. infrastructure
competitiveness remained the top ranking and Spain slipped from ninth to tenth
place (IMD, 2004).
The World Bank initially viewed large infrastructure projects as key to devel-
opment and, after its start in 1960, the Inter-American Development Bank also invest-
ed heavily in infrastructure. But beginning in the mid-1970s, there was a gradual
shift away from such projects toward those aimed at education, health, and poverty-
reduction. More recently, the World Bank has begun to re-evaluate the importance
of infrastructure and a number of studies have concluded that lagging performance
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in infrastructure “has cascading negative effects throughout the economy. It increas-
es the cost of doing business, decreases international competitiveness, and hinders
the country’s growth and poverty alleviation prospects” (World Bank, 2003: 1).
Mexico has long under-invested in infrastructure but government investment
in infrastructure as a percentage of GDP fell precipitously from about 8 percent in
1980 to 1.2  percent in 2003. In 1960, Korea had less than half of Mexico’s paved road
density. In 2005, it had 11 times that of Mexico. Similarly, in 1969, Korea had one-
third the power infrastructure per capita of Mexico but, in 2005, it had three times as
much. While the comparison with Korea is particularly sharp, Mexico also compares
poorly with other major Latin American countries. For example, Mexico’s road densi-
ty is currently about one-half that of Brazil. Moreover, the costs of railways and ports
in Mexico are higher than in Brazil and the U.S (World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2005; Rodríguez Barocio, 2005: 15). 
The lack of infrastructure and its poor quality and reliability have added signi-
ficantly to the cost of doing business in Mexico. It also has encouraged foreign in-
vestment to concentrate on the border. Therefore, one effective way to reduce
geographical disparities within Mexico while reducing pressures for out-migration
would be to improve the road system from the U.S. border to the center and southern
parts of the country. Because of foreign investment, the northern border economy is
booming and attracting labor from the poorer parts of the country. However, in many
cases, workers stay on the Mexican side of the border only long enough to learn
how to cross into the United States, where they can earn a lot more. U.S. firms do not
like to invest in the border area because of the pollution and the inefficiencies asso-
ciated with such a high turnover rate, but they do so because the roads from the
border to the center of the country are bad or non-existent. 
If roads were built or improved from the border to the center of the country,
investors would locate there for three reasons. First, the center and south of the
country –Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Michoacán, Guanajuato– have the highest rates of un-
employment and, indeed, are the principal sources of immigrants to the border and
to the United States. Secondly, the wage level is much lower in these areas but the
workers are no less educated than those on the border. Indeed, they are often the same
workers. Finally, the region is not the polluted, cramped border. The government
has incentive systems to encourage investors to locate there but the problem is a
lack of infrastructure: roads, electricity, etc. Build them, and investors would come,
immigration levels would decline and so would disparities in income. 
Mexico has been criticized for subsidizing higher education at the cost of ele-
mentary and secondary schools and that is true (Kogan, 1987: 56-78). But Spain and
Portugal discovered that investments in technical and community colleges in rural
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areas had a large multiplier effect. College-educated students returned from the cap-
ital to their small towns to teach at these colleges and, as they raised a family, they
insisted on improvements in elementary and secondary schools that their children
attended. The community colleges proved to be the catalyst for improving the level
of education at all levels in the rural areas.
3) Mechanism/Institution. In the interest of using scarce resources most effec-
tively and keeping bureaucracy to the minimum, the three governments should
establish a “North American Investment Fund” as the principal instrument for
channeling money to narrow the income gap. North America should not create a
new bank. Rather, it should deposit money in a fund that would be administered
by the World Bank (and/or the Inter-American Development Bank) under the su-
pervision of a board appointed by all three governments. To avoid the EU’s problem
of perpetual institutionalization, the fund should have a “sunset” provision. It should
have a 10-year term, and it should be continued beyond that date only by decision
of all three governments. 
Some have proposed using the North American Development Bank (NAD Bank),
but that institution’s mission is to invest in environmental and small infrastructure
projects near the border, and it does not have the capability for the large infrastruc-
ture projects needed to close the development gap. Rather than provide funds and
personnel to give the bank such a capability, it would make more sense to use an exist-
ing institution with proven capability. To establish such a fund, the leaders of the three
countries would need to make such a request of the president of the World Bank. 
4) Magnitude and Focus. How much money would be needed for such a fund,
and how should it be allocated? The World Bank has estimated that Mexico has a
10-year infrastructure deficit of US$20 billion per year. This is separate from the
additional US$10 billion that Mexico needs to invest annually in the exploration and
development of its natural gas and oil fields (Guigale, et al., 2001: 2, 10-11, 357-376).
The computer model suggests a similar amount: US$17-20 billion in new capital
each year, net of interest payments, to grow at an annual rate of 6 percent for a de-
cade in order to close the income gap by 20 percent. On the other hand, they note that
Mexico cannot service new debt of that magnitude but that half of that could come
from domestic savings –an increase in taxes. The rest would have to come from its
neighbors. Thus, the North American Investment Fund should be prepared to pro-
vide US$20 billion in grants per year for 10 years in order to help Mexico grow at a
rate of 6 percent for a decade. 
How should the funds be spent? The fund should invest in two areas: infrastruc-
ture that would connect the center and south of Mexico to its northern neighbors and
education in the poor rural areas of Mexico. Eighty-five percent of the funds should be
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spent in infrastructure, building roads from the northern border to the cities in the cen-
ter and south, bypassing Mexico City. The projects should include ports, railroads,
airports, telecommunications, etc. Thirteen percent of the funds should be used to
build community colleges in Mexico’s rural areas and two percent to serve as match-
ing funds for each country to promote research and educational exchanges. 
Europe, of course, has spent more than twice as much as is proposed here for
more than 20 years, but it was spent in too many areas, which, however commend-
able, diluted the impact. If the funds are to provide a needed jolt for the Mexican econ-
omy, then the three nations need to avoid three temptations. They should not spend
the money: a) in the poorest part of Mexico; b) on the border; c) on other commend-
able projects, whether related to the environment, justice, poverty, etc. Although these
are all worthwhile projects or areas, the funds would be most effective if they were
concentrated. Using the funds on the U.S.-Mexican border will exacerbate, not solve,
its problems. It would increase the power of the magnet, which is emptying the most
enterprising labor from the southern and central parts of Mexico. Some funds are,
of course, needed on the border but this job should be left to the North American
Development Bank, not the North American Investment Fund. 
Considerable funds have been expended in the poorer, emigrant-sending regions
of Mexico, but these investments often fail because they lack a strategy for connect-
ing them to the markets to the north. In other words, the North American Investment
Fund should begin with a strategy of connecting Mexico to the markets of the north,
and funds should be spent in the poorer regions only as a part of that strategy.
As the EU found, once there is a fund, many groups will want to spend the
resources in many areas. This would work if there were an inexhaustible supply of
funds, but that is never the case. Therefore, the lesson is to concentrate the money
where it is most needed and will have the greatest effect on the community as a whole.
That means investing in infrastructure (connecting the poorer countries to the richer
ones) and education in the poorer regions. This will require great leadership as the
American political system combines the political need to embrace all perspectives
with a chronic attention-deficit disorder. North America needs to resist legitimate
demands to divide up the funds into small projects and focus on the most impor-
tant continental projects.
5) A Community and Conditionality. Of the US$20 billion each year for the North
American Investment Fund, Canada and the United States should pay half, with
the U.S. –with about nine times the economy of Canada– accounting for 90 percent
of that. Mexico should contribute the other US$10 billion. The United States and
Canada are unlikely to contribute funds unless both countries feel that they would be
used wisely and that Mexico would undertake serious long-term reforms. Mexico
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understands that it needs to undertake fundamental reforms in sensitive sectors
such as energy, taxes, pensions, electricity, and the judicial system, but the political
system has been stalemated. If its partners were to define, together, a community of
three nations in which each would contribute to that future, then that might alter
the political balance in a way that would make both the reforms and the fund pos-
sible. Absent those changes, the U.S. and Canada might very well conclude that
their funds would not be put to good use and would not want to contribute. Spain
and Ireland understood the need for reforms, but they could only implement them
with the support of the EU.
On fiscal reforms, Mexico relied on its oil monopoly to save its people from
paying taxes. In 2003, Mexico received 18 percent of its gross domestic product in
federal tax revenues. Of that, 6.5 percent came from oil revenues and 11.8 percent
from the federal income tax. That tax rate is the lowest in the OECD countries. Because
the tax revenues are so low, the government needs to make up that huge short-fall
by taking funds from Pemex, the oil company, leaving it with a bloated, inefficient
bureaucracy that lacks funds for its own investments. As a result, Mexico, rich in
natural gas and other fossil fuels, finds itself importing about 25 percent of its natu-
ral gas from the United States, itself a net importer.
Mexico needs to increase its fiscal revenue as a percent of GDP from 11.8 percent
in 2003 to about 18 percent.5 With a gross domestic product of US$668 billion in
2006, the additional revenue would amount to US$41.4 billion, which would meet
its Investment Fund obligations and permit Pemex to have substantial funds for
exploration. President Felipe Calderon recognized the importance of fiscal reform
and, on June 20, 2007, his finance minister unveiled a proposal for an alternative
minimum flat corporate tax of 19 percent, which is designed to increase federal tax
revenues by 1.5 percent of GDP in the first year, increasing to 2.8 percent by 2012.
Leaving aside the question as to whether the Mexican Congress will approve that
much of the proposal, in the first year, additional revenue would amount to US$10
billion, rising to US$18.7 billion by 2012. This would represent a major step for-
ward, though not as much as needed.
The formula both for narrowing the development gap and creating a genuine
partnership in North America is defined as “a community of interests,” in which all
three contribute in their respective ways. How will the United States and Canada
benefit from such a program? In the short term, Canadian and U.S. companies will
have new opportunities to build the infrastructure in Mexico. For every dollar of
growth in the Mexican economy, trade with the U.S. and Canada will increase by
5 For a superb analysis of the tax issue, see Ramírez de la O., 2004: 9.
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about US$0.40. If Mexico’s growth rate increases from 3 percent to 6 percent, that
means US$20 billion more for the economy and US$8 billion more in trade with its
two neighbors in one year. Compounded annually for a decade, that will not only
contribute to Mexico’s development but to North America’s. 
This will not affect undocumented migration in the short term, but it is the only
solution in the long term. It will take decades to close the gap but, if Mexico begins
to grow faster than its northern neighbors, this will affect the perceptions of people
in all three countries. Mexicans might begin to believe in their country’s future, and,
instead of calculating ways to cross the border, they might invest in their region. 
At the end of the World War II, the United States turned on its head the approach
that the victors of great wars had taken. After every war, the victors pillaged the
defeated or, in modern parlance, “imposed reparations” and shared the spoils with
their allies. Perhaps the worst example occurred at the end of World War I, and Nazism
and fascism were the bitter fruits of that approach. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and
Harry Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall fashioned the opposite policy:
instead of plundering the vanquished, they offered a “Marshall Plan,” the largest
foreign aid program in human history to both allies and enemies and on the condition
that they present a common plan that would lead to prosperity and peace for all. 
It is that kind of vision aimed at lifting its weakest neighbor that North Amer-
ica needs from its leaders today. In the absence of a cooperative vision of North
America’s future, the request for resources or reforms by one party or another will
look like foreign aid or special pleading and is unlikely to attract support. With a
shared goal for a community of three sovereign nations, it would be easier to ask
members to contribute. 
The first draft was enunciated in Guanajuato, Mexico, in February 2001 at the
conclusion of the first summit meeting between Presidents Fox and Bush when they
pledged, “After consultation with our Canadian partners, we will strive to consolidate
a North American economic community whose benefits reach the lesser-developed
areas of the region and extend to the most vulnerable social groups in our countries”
(Presidencia de la República, 2001).
While the promise of that statement was not realized, the fact that a Republican
president accepted this goal is not inconsequential, and this could be the platform
for a genuine North American Community. If North America cannot achieve that
goal of narrowing the income gap, then the hopes that many poor and middle-
income countries have had of finding a path to modernization through free trade
would be dashed. If North America succeeds, then it will provide an example and
an inspiration for the entire world.
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